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The National Football League (NFL) has enjoyed a lofty position among
other professional sports leagues and has claimed its spot as "America's
Game" in recent years.1 In a July 2009 ESPN poll, the NFL had the highest
twelve-month average fan interest compared to all other leagues or sports. 2
Much of the NFL's popularity can be attributed to its television deals, which
provide fans with almost constant NFL programming, and the revenue that
such deals have generated for the NFL. Entering the 2007 season, the NFL
had television contracts in place with the following television rights holders
with annual values as follows: ESPN ($1.1 billion through 2013), 3 Fox
($712.5 million through 2011), 4 CBS ($622.5 million through 2011), 5 NBC
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1. See generally America's Game: The Super Bowl Champions (NFL Network); MICHAEL
MACCAMBRIDGE, AMERICA'S GAME: THE EPIC STORY OF How PRO FOOTBALL CAPTURED A
NATION (chronicling the Super Bowl, its rise to popularity, and pinnacle as national holiday status as
NFL football has increased in popularity in the United States).
2. ESPN Sports Poll: NHL Avid Fan Interest at 12-Month High in July, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTS Bus. DAILY, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/132818.
3. Daniel Kaplan & John Ourand, 'MNF' Offer on Table in ESPN-NFL Net Talks, STREET &
SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., July 7, 2008 at 1, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/
article/59503.
4. Fox extended its deal with the NFL through the 2013 season at an estimated two percent
increase per year. Stuart Levine, CBS, Fox Extend NFL Deals, VARIETY, May 19, 2009, available at
http://www.variety.com/article/VR 111 8003970.html?categoryid=1 011 &cs=1.
5. Id.
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($600 million through 2011),6 and DirecTV ($700 million through 2010 and
$1 billion per year 2011-2014). 7 Furthermore, the proliferation of fantasy
football has allowed for avid fans to become even more involved in NFL
games and has helped grow interest among casual fans by giving them reasons
to become invested in the performance of players throughout the NFL, not just
the fans' local team.
Another primary reason for the success of the NFL that cannot be
discounted has been the relative labor peace between the National Football
League Management Council (NFLMC), the representative body for the NFL
clubs with respect to collective bargaining, and the National Football League
Players Association (NFLPA), the representative body for the NFL players
with respect to collective bargaining. The last work stoppage in the NFL
occurred during the 1987 season when the players' union went on strike in an
effort to obtain true free agency, among other things. 8 Comparatively, the
other three major professional sports leagues in the United States, the National
Basketball Association, 9 Major League Baseball,' 0 and the National Hockey
League, " have each undergone at least one work stoppage during that period.
In 1987, the NFL players' union was unsuccessful in its strike due to many
factors including lack of solidarity among union members and continuance of
NFL games played by replacement players. 12
Following the 1987 strike and bouts of legal proceedings between the
6. NBC extended its deal with the NFL through the 2013 season at an estimated two percent
increase per year. John Eggerton, NBC, NFL Extend Deal for Two More Years, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/328038-
NBCNFLExtendDealForTwoMoreYears.php.
7. DirecTV extended its deal with the NFL to have the exclusive right to broadcast the Sunday
Ticket Package from 2011-2014 at an annual value of one billion dollars during such period.
Matthew Futterman, NFL, DirecTV Extend Pact in $4 Billion Deal, WALL STREET J., Mar. 24, 2009,
at B5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123786503490122053.html; NFL Media Rights
Deals for '07 Season, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. DAILY, Sept. 6, 2007, http://
www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/1 14714.
8. Paul D. Staudohar, The Football Strike of 1987: A Question of Free Agency, 111 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 26, 27 (1988).
9. National Basketball Association underwent a 191-day lockout beginning on July 1, 1998.
NBPA History, NBPA.COM, http://www.nbpa.com/history.php (last visited Sept. 3, 2009).
10. Major League Baseball underwent a 32-day spring training lockout in 1990 and a 232-day
strike in 1994, including the cancellation of the 1994 post-season. Don Fehr Announces Retirement,
MLB.COM, June 22, 2009, http://www.mlb.com/pa/news/
article.jsp?ymd=20090622&content id=5470258&vkey-=mlbpa.news&fext=.jsp.
11. National Hockey League underwent a 103-day lockout during the 1994-95 season and a
complete cancellation of the 2004-05 season due to a lockout. Paul D. Staudohar, The Hockey
Lockout of 2004-05, 128 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 12, 23 (2005).
12. Staudohar, supra note 8, at 27.
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NFLPA and the NFLMC, the parties negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) in 1993.13 This CBA was extended several times and
serves as the basis for the most current CBA between the NFLPA and the
NFLMC, which was most recently extended in 2006.14 The 2006 CBA
initially was set to expire following the 2012 season; 15 however, the 2006
CBA allows either party to terminate the 2006 CBA early, essentially
eliminating the final two years of the 2006 CBA. 16 In March 2008, the NFL
owners elected to exercise this early termination option, 17 thus, making the
2010 season the final league year under the 2006 CBA. 18 Consequently, the
NFL is in a precarious situation. The NFLMC and the NFLPA must agree on
terms to extend or create a new CBA prior to March 1, 2010, (the "2010
League Year") to avoid an uncapped 2010 season and all of the ramifications
that an uncapped year would entail. 19 More importantly, the NFLMC and the
NFLPA must agree on terms to extend or create a new CBA prior to March 1,
2011, to prevent a work stoppage in the 2011 season.2 0
The CBA negotiations may have an added hurdle to overcome as the
respective leaders of the NFLMC, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell, and the
NFLPA Executive Director DeMaurice Smith, are overseeing their first
collective bargaining negotiation as leaders of their organizations. 2 1 Some
commentators believe that this new leadership could slow the negotiation
process because of the lack of familiarity in working with each other.22
The NFLPA and the NFLMC recently have commenced CBA




16. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, art. LVIII § 3(a) (March 8,
2006) [hereinafter NFL CBA].
17. Nat.'l Football League, supra note 13.
18. NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. LVIII §3(a).
19. Vie Carucci, Commissioner, Owners Preparing for Crucial CBA Discussions, NFL.COM,
http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80f699 1 d&template-without-video-with-
comments&confirmn--true (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
20. See Patrick Patterson, Oakland Raiders and the Countdown to 2011: The Coming Labor War,
EXAMINER.COM, Feb. 14, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/
x-514-Oakland-Raiders-Examiner-y2009m2d 14-Oakland-Raiders-and-the-countdown-to-20 11 -The-
coming-labor-war.
21. Liz Mullen, Another Variable: New Leadership, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUS. J., Aug.
17-23, 2009 at 29 [hereinafter New Leadership]; NFL General Counsel, Jeff Pash, is assuming a
leading role on behalf of the NFLMC. Liz Mullen, League Wants to Deduct More Costs from
Revenue, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUS. J., Aug. 17-23, 2009, at 28.
22. See New Leadership, supra note 21.
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negotiations, but there are many issues where the parties have conflicting
views. This article will highlight some of the main issues that likely will be
disputed topics during the CBA negotiations. Furthermore, this article will
discuss in greater detail the ramifications and consequences of a failure to
agree on terms to extend or create a new CBA prior to the 2010 League Year.
II. DISPUTED TOPICS
As the NFLMC and the NFLPA begin negotiations toward a new CBA,
the parties face numerous issues that may prevent them from reaching an
agreement before the owners have the ability to lock out the players for the
2011 NFL season. The NFLMC and NFLPA must negotiate in good faith on
the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, which include hours, wages,
and working conditions.23 The primary issue between the two bargaining
parties relates to the current revenue split between players and owners, 24
which is considered a mandatory subject of collective bargaining regarding
wages. Another issue that may be negotiated, which most likely is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining because of its indirect tie to
wages, 25 is the NFL Personal Conduct Policy (the "Policy"). Both of these
issues will be highlighted below, pointing out each side's optimal result of the
negotiations and offering a possible resolution to each issue.
A. Revenue Sharing-Revenue Split
One of the main points of contention between the NFLMC and the
NFLPA is the revenue split between the players and the owners. 26 The
owners want to rework the revenue split between the players and the owners
agreed to in the 2006 CBA that pays the players almost sixty percent of total
revenue.27 Essentially, players are allocated a percentage of the NFL's total
revenue via the salary cap.28 The salary cap is an adjustable calculation that
sets a team's maximum payroll for a league year. 29  The salary cap
23. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996).
24. Len Pasquarelli, Goodell Facing Another Uphill Climb, ESPN.COM, July 10, 2009,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=pasquarelli-len&id=4318632.
25. Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different From Illegal Group
Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58 CATH.
U. L. REv. 631, 655-57 (2009).
26. Pasquarelli, supra note 24.
27. Smith Trying to Avoid Lockout, ESPN.coM, July 14, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/
nfl/news/story?id=4327298 [hereinafter Smith].




theoretically works in favor of both the players and the owners. 3o When the
NFL's total revenue increases, the salary cap likewise increases and both the
owners and players should make more money. 31 However, when the NFL's
total revenue decreases, theoretically, both the players and owners suffer the
effects of such decrease. 32 NFL team owners, however, believe the current
salary cap structure is not working. 33 The owners currently claim to be losing
money per game due to the increased expenses of operating a franchise (e.g.
stadium operations), while the NFLPA claims that the owners are not only
earning a profit each year, but the values of the NFL franchises are increasing
at a rapid rate. 34
Approximately sixty percent of revenue generated by each team goes to
the players, which leaves owners with the remaining forty percent to pay the
team's other expenses, such as stadium costs and the team's staff.35 The
owners would like to reduce the revenue number allocated to the players or
alter what constitutes total revenue under salary cap calculations so that the
owners keep more of the revenue. 36  All is not lost on the money issue
however, because it may provide owners what they want and let players
maintain or increase their portion of revenues.
One possible way of increasing revenue would be to increase the number
of regular season games.37 By increasing the number of regular season
games, the total revenue figure would be increased, thereby allowing the
players to maintain their current pay structure, while giving the owners the
additional revenue needed to earn a profit to their satisfaction. 38 It is likely
that a compromise would need to be made, such as reducing the number of
preseason games, which may be too numerous anyway. 39
An issue to be considered, however, is the additional pay that players may
request due to additional regular season games. 40 Additional regular season
30. See Patterson, supra note 20.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Daniel Kaplan, Goodell Says as Many as 20% of NFL Games May be Blacked Out, STREET
& SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. DAILY, Sept. 4, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/133093.
34. See id.; see also Smith, supra note 27; Union: No Reason for NFL Lockout, ESPN.COM, Jan.
29, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?id=3870398&section=nfl.
35. Smith, supra note 27.
36. See Union: No Reason for NFL Lockout, supra note 34.
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games would increase injury risk to NFL players' careers, which are already
relatively short. 4 1 Players would likely want to leverage this increased injury
risk by receiving even higher pay, which may create another conflict between
the parties. Consequently, a solution to this issue will not be simple or
straightforward. If the owners and players cannot agree on this revenue split
issue, the two sides appear headed toward an uncapped 2010 League Year,
which, as discussed in more detail below, could have a significant impact on
the NFL and ultimately lead the parties into a lockout. 42
B. Personal Conduct Policy
The Policy received a wholesale revision when then-new NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell overhauled the existing player conduct policy to
include off the field conduct.43 The Policy states, "[a]ll persons associated
with the NFL are required to avoid 'conduct detrimental to the integrity of and
public confidence in the National Football League." ' 44 The Policy gives the
Commissioner the ultimate authority to discipline any violator of the Policy
and the power to review any appeal.45 The Commissioner's absolute authority
over the discipline and appeals of players may be a hot topic at the bargaining
table.
Unfortunately, the Commissioner has had to enforce the Policy relatively
frequently since its inception. In the past several months, the Commissioner
suspended Marshawn Lynch for three games for having a concealed firearm,
which was his second run-in with the law, and the Commissioner ultimately
denied his appeal; 46 punished Michael Vick for his role in a dog fighting
operation for up to six regular season games, subsequently reducing this
suspension to two games; 47 and suspended Donte Stallworth indefinitely for
killing a man while driving intoxicated. 48 The disciplinary decisions in each
41. See id.
42. Barry Wilner, Union, League to Meet Tuesday, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmI/sports/2009960440_apfbnnfilabor.html?syndication=rss.
43. See Edelman, supra note 25, at 632.
44. See NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY 1, 1 (2008),
available at http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template.aspx? fmid=181&lmid=336&pid=0&type-n.
45. Id. at 2-3.
46. Michael Smith, Bills RB Lynch Suspended First 3 Games, ESPN.COM, Apr. 9, 2009,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4054396; Lynch's Suspension Upheld, ESPN.COM, Aug.
4, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4374980.
47. Vick Eligible to Play in Third Week, ESPN.COM, Sept. 4, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/
nfl/news/story?id=4442627.




of these situations could have been handled differently by the Commissioner
in light of the severity of each of the offenses and punishments given for each
situation.
Ways to reduce the scrutiny relating to the Commissioner's disciplinary
decisions regarding players' off-the-field transgressions would be to adopt
disciplinary guidelines for punishment, let the Commissioner retain his initial
authority, but also have an independent review panel oversee all player
appeals to ensure fairness and to avoid arbitrary and capricious punishment.
This suggestion would impart more objectivity into the NFL disciplinary
process and likely reduce any potential claims of partiality.
III. EFFECT OF 2010 UNCAPPED YEAR
In the event that the NFLMC and the NFLPA do not reach an agreement
prior to March 1, 2010, certain provisions of the 2006 CBA will be enacted
that will have a different effect in an uncapped 2010 League Year. The
changes caused by an uncapped year will be discussed further below.
A. Salaries
A failure to reach an agreement by March 1, 2010, would primarily affect
players' salaries and team payroll. 49 If no agreement is reached by March 1,
2010, then 2010 will be the final league year with an existing agreement. 50 In
such event, the 2010 League Year will be uncapped, meaning no salary cap
would be in effect for 2010.51 Accordingly, in the 2010 League Year, teams
would not be restricted as to the amount of payroll that they could carry.
Therefore, hypothetically, a team that greatly values a certain free agent may
outbid other teams for that player's services without the restrictions of the
salary cap. In such event, big market teams or free-spending owners could
potentially acquire much of the top free agent talent and effectively sway the
competitive balance in the NFL.
Conversely, no-minimum-team-salary requirement would exist in an
uncapped 2010 League Year.52 The minimum-team-salary requirement is the
amount of payroll that a team is required to have at the end of each year in
which the salary cap is in effect. 53 The minimum-team-salary is calculated as
49. Daniel Kaplan & Liz Mullen, NFL Sides Prepare for Uncapped Year, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTS BUS. J., Sept. 7, 2009 at 1, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/63447.
50. NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. LVIII §3(a).
51. Id. at art. LVI § 1.
52. Id. at art. XXIV § 5(a).
53. Id.
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a certain percentage of that year's salary cap, which had a base year value of
84% in 2006, and the required amount increases each year by 1.2% but never
to exceed 90%.54 For example, in the 2009 league year, teams have a
minimum-team-salary requirement of 87.8% of the salary cap. 55
In the event of an uncapped year with no salary cap and no-minimum-
team- salary, the possibility exists that teams will utilize an uncapped year to
lower players' salaries. 56 Operating without a minimum salary requirement
would allow the owners to set the market for free agents and rookies without
any artificial salary floors. 57 In such event, the NFL offseason would become
a true free market governed by the economic principle of supply and demand.
As previously discussed in this article, a primary reason for the owners
opting out of the CBA is the perceived breakdown of the current financial
model. 58 The NFLMC believes that the current financial model is harming
them by providing the players with too large of a revenue share. 59 Anthony
Noto, NFL Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer stated, "for
every dollar of new revenue generated by the league since the CBA was
renewed in '06, the league has lost $0.06 and the players have reaped $0.75. ' '60
Consequently, the owners could address this financial concern by driving
down players' salaries by offering lower value-contracts to free agents and
rookies. Owners, however, need to be cautious to avoid acting in concert by
lowering salaries and thus, acting in collusion, which would violate antitrust
law.61
B. Player Movement
An uncapped 2010 League Year also could affect the movement of players
throughout the NFL. The uncapped 2010 League Year would alter the free
agency eligibility qualifications for the players. 62 Generally, in any league
year where the salary cap is effective, a player that has four or more accrued
seasons is eligible for unrestricted free agency at the expiration of his player
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Kaplan, supra note 49.
57. Patterson, supra note 20.
58. See generally, Pasquarelli, supra note 24; Kaplan, supra note 32.
59. Kaplan, supra note 33.
60. Id.
61. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 263 (1996).
62. See J.I. Halsell, How Clubs Have Unprecedented Leverage by the Looming Uncapped Year,




contract.63 Unrestricted free agency is highly beneficial for a player because
he is completely free to negotiate and sign with another team, and any team
can negotiate and sign that player without penalties or restrictions. 64 In
unrestricted free agency, teams essentially bid on a player's services in an
open marketplace, and the player goes to the team that pays the most money.
In an uncapped year, however, a player is not eligible for unrestricted free
agency until he has six or more accrued seasons at the expiration of his player
contract. 65 Consequently, in an uncapped year, a player would not be eligible
for unrestricted free agency until such player is entering his seventh NFL
season, instead of being eligible prior to his fifth NFL season in a capped
year.66
Players that would feel the effects of the uncapped year directly would be
those players with four or more, but less than six accrued seasons that have
contracts expiring in an uncapped 2010 League Year or any other uncapped
year.67 In an uncapped 2010 League Year, these players would be restricted
free agents, 68 which is less favorable for players because if certain procedures
are followed, their prior teams have the right of first refusal and the right to
receive draft choice compensation regarding any contracts that players would
sign with another team. 69
To receive the right of first refusal, draft choice compensation, or both, a
restricted free agent's prior team must tender the restricted free agent a
qualifying offer on or prior to the first date of the restricted free agent's
signing period.70 By tendering a qualifying offer, the prior team receives a
right of first refusal to match any contract offer that a restricted free agent
receives; if the prior team chooses not to exercise its right of first refusal, then
the prior team may receive draft choice compensation from the team that the
restricted free agent signs with depending on which qualifying offer the prior
team tendered to the restricted free agent. 7' For example, if the prior team
63. NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XIX § 1(a)
64. Id.; Unrestricted free agents are subject to franchise and transition player designations from
the player's previous club, which would effectively chill the player's chances of a signing a contract
with another team. See NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XIX § 1(a), XX.
65. Id. at art. LVI § 2.
66. See J.I. Halsell, How Clubs Have Unprecedented Leverage by the Looming Uncapped Year,
INSIDE THE CAP WITH J.I. HALSELL, Aug. 24, 2009, http://insidethecap.blogspot.com/2009/08/why-
vince-wilfork-is-perplexed-how.html.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also, NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XIX § 2.
69. See NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XIX § 2.
70. Id. § 2(b).
71. See Halsell, supra note 63.
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tenders a restricted free agent a qualifying offer at an amount that qualifies for
a right of first refusal, first and third round draft choice compensation, and if
another team signs the restricted free agent to a contract that the prior team
does not match, then the new team must compensate the prior team with first
and third round draft choices in that year's NFL draft.72 Accordingly,
restricted free agency has a chilling effect on player movement because
additional costs potentially exist in the form of draft choice compensation that
depresses the marketplace for the services of restricted free agents.
Another provision enacted in the event of an uncapped 2010 League Year
that could limit player movement is the Final Eight Plan. 73 The Final Eight
Plan limits the unrestricted free agents that the top four teams in each
conference from the previous year may sign to a contract. 74 The four teams
that played in the NFC and AFC Championship games may only sign
unrestricted free agents that (a) are acquired via the NFL waiver system; (b)
were previously under contract with such team; or (c) are signed after such
team loses one of its own free agents to another team. 75 The four teams that
lost in the playoff games immediately prior to the NFC and AFC
Championship games are subject to the same limitations discussed
immediately above; however, these teams also may sign one unrestricted free
agent that has a first-year salary of $4,925,000 or more, any number of
unrestricted free agents that have a first-year salary of "no more than
$3,275,000 and an annual increase in any future contract years of no more than
30% of the first contract year [s]alary... [,] "or both. 76
The Final Eight Plan affects player movement by prohibiting, in certain
circumstances, twenty-five percent of the teams in the NFL from signing a
certain class of unrestricted free agents. This limitation eliminates competitors
from the marketplace for the services of unrestricted free agents, which may
not only limit player movement, but may also reduce player salaries due to
fewer teams bidding on unrestricted free agents' services.
C. Benefits
Another consequence of an uncapped 2010 League Year is the effect on
player benefit programs. An uncapped year could have a significant impact on
72. NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XIX § 2.
73. See NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XXI.
74. See id.
75. NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XXI §§ 2,4.
76. NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XXI § 3.
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the application of the benefit programs to both active and retired players. 77 In
an uncapped year, teams are not required to contribute monetarily to certain
player benefit programs, except to the extent required by the Internal Revenue
Code.78 Such programs include the Second Career Savings Plan, the Player
Annuity Program, the Severance Pay Plan, the NFL Player Supplemental
Disability Plan, the Health Reimbursement Account, the NFL Player Benefits
Committee, the Workers' Compensation Time Offset Fund, the Performance
Based Pool, and the Tuition Assistance Plan (collectively, the "Benefit
Programs"). 79
An uncapped year could preclude a player from being eligible for certain
programs. Under the 88 Plan, the program that provides medical benefits to
eligible former players determined to be suffering from dementia, one of the
eligibility requirements is that a former player must qualify for the program
during a year in which the salary cap was in place. 80 The 88 Plan continues
operating during uncapped years and after the expiration of the 2006 CBA;
however, former players may only qualify during capped years.
81
Accordingly, if a former player does not qualify for the 88 Plan prior to an
uncapped 2010 League Year, such former player may never be eligible for the
88 Plan unless a new CBA is agreed to that includes a salary cap or the terms
of the 88 Plan are amended. An uncapped year also could affect the funds
available under the Benefit Programs. The NFL Players Health
Reimbursement Account, the program that reimburses eligible players and
their dependents for medical expenses, could have a limited existence in
uncapped years as it would continue until all nominal accounts in such
program have been paid or have been forfeited.82 If the NFL teams exercise
their right to not contribute to the program during an uncapped year, then
players conceivably would have a lesser amount of funds to draw from, with
the potential risk of exhausting the funds in the program.
Similarly, the operation of the NFL Player Benefits Administration, if
established, could deplete funds from certain programs of the Benefit
Programs. 83 The NFL Player Benefits Administration is the administrative
service provider of the labor-management committee jointly established by the
77. Kaplan, supra note 50.
78. NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XLVI § 6.
79. Id.
80. NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XLVIII-D § 4.
81. Id.
82. NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XLVIII-C § 7.
83. See id. at art. XLVIII-E § 4.
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NFLMC and NFLPA and the NFL Player Benefits Committee. 84 During an
uncapped year, the NFL Players Benefits Administration would be funded by
the Bert Bell-Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, the NFL Player
Supplemental Disability Plan, the NFL Player Second Career Savings Plan,
the NFL Player Annuity Program, the 88 Plan, and the Health Reimbursement
Plan proportionately in accordance with the services provided to each such
plan, or otherwise to the extent the parties agree.85
Therefore, during an uncapped year, the operations of the NFL Player
Benefits Administration could deplete the funds of the respective plans listed
above, which would detrimentally affect the players. Such actions could have
a significant detrimental effect if such plan funds are lower in the event that
the teams have exercised their right not to contribute to the Benefit Programs.
An uncapped 2010 League Year likely would have a significant impact on
all parties related to the NFL. In an uncapped year, there would be far less
salary guidelines and restrictions, so the free agent marketplace would be
much more like a free market system. 86 This less restrictive marketplace,
however, does not guarantee players will be able to earn higher salaries as
many teams may take advantage of the no-minimum-team-salary exception in
an uncapped year to drive down players' salaries. 87 Additionally, an uncapped
year could depress the number of players moving between teams due to the
increased accrued season requirement for unrestricted free agent eligibility, as
well as the Final Eight Plan.88 Furthermore, an uncapped year could have a
significant detrimental effect on Benefit Programs for active and former
players.89 An uncapped year could affect player's eligibility for certain of the
Benefit Programs and the funds available for some of the Benefit Programs.9"
IV. CONCLUSION
The NFL is faced with a very serious situation regarding the CBA
negotiations. The conflict between the NFLMC and the NFLPA regarding the
split of the NFL's total revenues likely will be the primary issue of the CBA
negotiations. Both parties will be looking to ensure that the health of their
wallets is well-protected in any new deal. The other likely topics of the CBA
84. Id. at art. XLVIII-E § 2.
85. Id. at art. XLVIII-E § 4.
86. See Halsell, supra note 67.
87. See Patterson, supra note 20.
88. See Halsell, supra note 67; see NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XXI.
89. See NFL CBA, supra note 16, at art. XLVIII-E § 4.




negotiations, the NFL Personal Conduct Policy, additional regular season
games, and a rookie salary cap or slotting system, also cannot be discounted as
factors driving the success of the CBA negotiations. An uncapped 2010
League Year appears to be a greater possibility, as Commissioner Goodell has
more readily accepted this likelihood. 9' Many people will be monitoring the
progress of the CBA negotiations with their eyes focused on March 1, 2011,
with the hope of avoiding the worst-case scenario: A 2011 season without
NFL football.
91. Barry Wilner, Goodell Sees NFL with Uncapped 2010 Season, FANHOUSE.COM, Sept. 4,
2009, http://www.fanhouse.com/news/main/goodell-sees-nfl-with-uncapped-2010/655936.
2009]

